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I. INTRODUCTION
Even if we assume that .. the G-O road will 'virtually destroy
the Indians' ability to practice their religion' . . . the Constitution
simply does not provide a principle that could justify upholding
respondents' legal claims.'
With that cavalier statement, the Supreme Court in Lyng v.
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association' proceeded to
dismiss a claim brought under the free exercise clause of the first
amendment.3 In Lyng, various Indian groups sought to prevent
the federal government from building a road through a forest area
which the Indians considered to be sacred. The lower courts found
that the government's need for the road was only arbitrary and
speculative.4 The Supreme Court, however, reversed the lower
courts and allowed the construction of the road.5 The Court's de-
cision, if adhered to in future cases, portends a more restrictive
interpretation of the free exercise clause, with profound implica-
tions for all religious groups.
Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of the Lyng decision is that
the Court upheld the government action without any showing of a
"compelling" interest. Instead, the Court held that construction of
the road did not "prohibit" the free exercise of religion under the
first amendment, even though the road would virtually destroy the
Indians' ability to practice their religion.6 Since no prohibition was
involved, the Court did not require the government to make any
showing of need for the road.
The Court interpreted the word "prohibit" to include only ac-
1. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. 1319, 1326-27
(1988) [hereinafter Lyng].
2. Id.
3. See infra notes 51-60 and accompanying text for an explanation of the free exercise
claim.
4. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 586, 595-
96 (N.D. Cal. 1983); Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 795 F.2d
688, 695 (9th Cir. 1986). See Lyng, 108 S. Ct. at 1339 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See infra
notes 58 and 84.
5. Lying, 108 S. Ct. at 1324.
6. Id. at 1326-27.
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tions that are coercive.7 Under this interpretation, the free exercise
clause does not restrict government actions which a court deems
non-coercive, even if the impact on religion is devastating. More-
over, the government is not required to demonstrate any need or
compelling interest for its actions as long as the actions are not, in
form, coercive.8 In essence, the determination of whether an ac-
tion prohibits the free exercise of religion is governed by the form
which the action takes rather than the impact of the action on the
religion.
This Note will first consider the trends in free exercise cases
prior to Lyng. Specifically, this Note will examine the types of gov-
ernment actions which have constituted a burden on the free exer-
cise of religion.9 The Note will then criticize the reasoning of the
Lyng case itself for considering only the form of the government's
action when determining whether a burden on religion exists.' 0 Fi-
nally, the impact that this decision will have on future free exercise
cases will be examined. 1
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Supreme Court's Traditional Analysis
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution pro-
vides in relevant part that "Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof."' 2 The Supreme Court, in interpreting the free exercise
clause, has distinguished between religious beliefs and actions. The
former are absolutely protected from any government regulation,
whereas the latter may be subject to some restrictions to- preserve
public safety, peace, or order. 3
In determining whether an action violates the free exercise
clause, the Court has developed a three-part test. 14 First, the
claimant must show that the government action results in a burden
7. Id. at 1326.
8. Id.
9. See infra notes 18-41 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 58-85, 100-71 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 172-76 and accompanying text.
12. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The free exercise clause was applied to the states through
the fourteenth amendment in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
13. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402-03 (1963). At first, the Court only invoked
the free exercise clause to protect beliefs, not actions. See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States,
98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878) ("Congress was deprived of all legislative power over mere opin-
ion, but was left free to reach actions which were in violation of social duties or subver-
sive of good order."). In time, however, the belief/action distinction faded.
14. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403.
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on religion.' 5 Second, the government must justify that burden by
demonstrating that the action serves a compelling interest.' 6 Fi-
nally, the action must be the least restrictive means available to
meet that government interest.' 7
The Court in Lyng placed free exercise cases into three general
categories.' 8 The first category comprises cases in which the bur-
den on religion was indirect. For example, in Sherbert v. Verner,'9
the Court addressed the constitutionality of the denial of unem-
ployment benefits to an applicant who refused to accept work re-
quiring her to violate the Sabbath.20 The Court employed the
three-part test and held that the denial of benefits was
unconstitutional. 21
The Court first examined whether the denial imposed a burden
on the free exercise of religion. The Court noted that any conse-
quences of the disqualification were merely indirect results of legis-
lation that the state had the power to enact.22 Nevertheless, the
Court found a burden on religion: "If the purpose or effect of a
law is to impede the observance of one or all religions or is to dis-
criminate invidiously between religions, that law is constitutionally
invalid even though the burden may be characterized as being only
indirect."23 By denying the unemployment benefits to the appli-
cant, the government effectively forced her to choose between fol-
lowing her religion and forfeiting benefits, or disregarding her
religion and accepting the work. 24 The Court ruled that the gov-
ernment's imposition of such a choice constituted a burden within
the scope of the free exercise clause. 25 The Court then proceeded
to find that the government had failed to demonstrate any compel-
ling interest sufficient to justify the burden. 26  As a result, the
15. Id.
16. Id. at 406.
17. Id. at 407.
18. The majority in Lyng was the first to categorize cases in this manner. Lyng, 108
S. Ct. at 1325-26. Numerous factors distinguish the past free exercise cases, and thus
different classifications could have been possible. In Lyng, however, the Court focused on
one specific aspect - the coercive nature of the government action - as a basis for
differentiation.. That categorization is used here because it will help the reader better
understand the Lyng Court's reasoning.
19. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
20. Id. at 399-401.
21. Id. at 410.
22. Id. at 403.
23. Id. at 404 (quoting Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961)).
24, Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 407-09.
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scheme was held unconstitutional. 27
The second general category of cases encompasses those in
which the government action imposed a direct burden on religion
or was directly coercive. Included in this category are cases in
which laws directly mandated certain actions by imposing criminal
or civil penalties for failure to comply. 28 In Wisconsin v. Yoder,29
for instance, the Court held that the conviction of Amish petition-
ers for their failure to obey a compulsory school-attendance law
violated the petitioners' right to the free exercise of religion.30
In determining that the law placed a burden upon the practice of
the Amish religion, the Court extensively discussed the Amish reli-
gion and its unique attributes. The Court concluded that the
Amish faith and lifestyle were inseparable and interdependent.3'
In addition, it determined that the refusal to comply with the
school-attendance law did not reflect a personal or philosophical
choice, but rather was rooted in religious belief.32 Because seclu-
sion from the world and its values were central to the Amish faith
and would be impaired or destroyed by the school attendance re-
quirement, the Court found that the law did in fact burden the free
exercise of the petitioner's religion.33 The government's interest in
preparing the children to be productive members of society was
27. See also Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981). The Thomas decision repre-
sents a more recent affirmation of the Sherbert doctrine. In Thomas, the Court examined
the denial of unemployment benefits to an applicant who quit because his religion forbade
him to fabricate weapons. Id. at 709. On reasoning similar to that of Sherbert, the Court
found that the denial constituted a burden, albeit an indirect one, on the free exercise of
religion. Id. at 717-18. In reaching that decision, the Court also analyzed whether
Thomas's opposition to the production of weapons was a personal philosophical choice or
was a religious belief. Id. at 714-15.
28. An early example of this type of case is Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145
(1878). In Reynolds, a law prohibiting polygamy was upheld when applied against a
member of the Mormon Church who believed that it was the duty of male members to
practice polygamy when circumstances permitted. Id.
29. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
30. Id. at 207. In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), the Court already
had struck down statutory requirements that children attend only public schools. In
Yoder, however, no formal alternative schooling was to be provided. Yoder, 406 U.S. at
210-11.
31. Id. at 215-16. Specifically, the Amish respondents:
[C]onvincingly demonstrated the sincerity of their religious beliefs, the interre-
lationship of belief with their mode of life, the vital role that belief and daily
conduct play in the continued survival of Old Order Amish communities and
their religious organization, and the hazards presented by the State's enforce-
ment of a statute generally valid as to others.
Id. at 235.
32. Id. at 215-16.
33. Id. at 226-27.
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adequately met by elementary education and the training later re-
ceived in the Amish community.3" Therefore, the law constituted a
direct and impermissible burden on the Amish parents' free exer-
cise of religion.35
The third category includes cases in which the Court found no
burden on religion. In this class of cases, the plaintiffs failed to
meet the first prong of the three-part test which requires the show-
ing of a burden on religion caused by the state action. As a result,
the Court did not require the government to demonstrate any com-
pelling interest for its actions.
For example, in Bowen v. Roy,3 6 the petitioner objected to the
use of a social security number for his daughter because he believed
that it might harm her spirit.3 7 The state was required to use the
social security number in the administration of the'Aid to Families
with Dependent Children program ("AFDC").3" The petitioner
objected to that use of the number, according to the Court, not
because it restricted what he could believe or do, but because he
believed that the use of the number would prevent his daughter
from maximizing her spiritual development.3 9 The Court declared
that the first amendment does not require the government to act in
ways designed to enhance the spiritual development of individual
believers or to conduct its internal affairs in accordance with the
religious beliefs of individual citizens.?° As a result, eight members
of the Court joined in finding such internal government action to
be constitutional. 41
34. Id.
35. The Yoder case dealt only with the burden on the parents' free exercise rights,
and did not directly address children's rights. In a dissenting opinion, however, Justice
Douglas did address children's rights. Id. at 241-49 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
36. 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
37. Id. at 695.
38. Id. at 699.
39. Id. at 696. The petitioner, Roy, believed that control over one's life was essential
to spiritual purity. Use of a social security number by the State was seen as destroying his
daughter's uniqueness and preventing attainment of greater spiritual power. Id.
40. Id. at 699. The Court stated:
Never to our knowledge has the Court interpreted the First Amendment to
require the Government itself to behave in ways that the individual believes will
further his or her spiritual development or that of his or her family. The Free
Exercise Clause cannot be understood to require the Government to conduct its
own internal affairs in ways that comport with the religious beliefs of particular
citizens.
Id. (emphasis in original).
41. Id. at 701. The second claim addressed in Roy was Congress's mandate that the
state require each AFDC applicant to furnish a social security number to the agency. Id.
The requirement compelled certain action by Roy, and thus would fall under the second
Loyola University Law Journal [Vol. 20
B. Application of the Traditional Analysis to Indian Lands
Prior to Lyng, numerous lower courts struggled with the consti-
tutional implications of government use of land which was sacred
to Indians.42 The lower courts generally applied the three-part test
enunciated by the Supreme Court. For instance, in Wilson v.
Block,4 3 the District of Columbia Circuit examined a law permit-
ting private parties to expand a ski area and recreational facilities
on the San Francisco Peaks in Cocino National Forest." The Nav-
ajo Indians objected to that use because they believed that the de-
velopment would impair the healing power of the Peaks.4"
Similarly, the Hopi Indians contested the expansion because of
their belief that the use of the Peaks for commercial purposes
would constitute a direct affront to the Creator."
In determining whether the government's action burdened reli-
gion, the court focused on the effects of the development upon the
Indians' beliefs and religious practices.47 The court concluded that
the plaintiffs had not demonstrated that the government land at
issue was central or indispensable to a religious practice.48 As a
result, no religious practice was impaired and, therefore, no burden
was shown.49
In a similar case, Badoni v. Higginson,50 the Tenth Circuit de-
nied relief to Indian plaintiffs by declaring that the government
interest in maintaining the water level of a lake5' outweighed the
category of claims illustrated by Yoder. Because the statute required affirmative action by
Roy that was contrary to his religious beliefs, it constituted a burden cognizable under
the first amendment. Id. at 706. A divided Court found that the requirement was none-
theless constitutional. Id. at 712.
42. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. 1319, 1338
(1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissent in Lyng provides a listing of lower court
cases which addressed these issues.
43. 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 956 (1983).
44. Id. at 738.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 740.
48. Id. at 743.
49. Id. In a similar case, Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 620 F.2d 1159 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980), members of the Cherokee religion brought a class
action to halt construction of the Tellico Dam on the Little Tennessee River. The plain-
tiffs alleged that the dam would flood their sacred homeland and destroy sacred sites. Id.
at 1160. The Sixth Circuit held that the Indians failed to demonstrate infringement of a
constitutionally cognizable interest because they did not prove that the land was central
to the practice of their religion. Id. at 1164. The court interpreted Yoder and lower court
cases as requiring such a showing in order to prove a burden on religion. Id.
50. 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 954 (1981).
51. The lake created by the dam was a necessary part of a multi-state water storage
and power generation project. Id. at 177.
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plaintiff's religious interests.5 2 By examining the government in-
terest first, the court avoided discussing whether a burden ex-
isted. 3 In a second challenge in Badoni, the Indians claimed that
the government burdened the practice of their religion by permit-
ting public access and the operation of commercial tour boats at
the site.54 The court held, however, that the government had not
prohibited the plaintiffs' religious exercises in the area, and that
any interference arose from the actions of the tourists, and not the
government.5 Moreover, the court noted that the plaintiffs were
seeking affirmative action by the government to exclude others
from the area, which would raise establishment clause implica-
tions.56 As a result, the court did not find a constitutional
violation. 7
III. THE L YNG OPINION
A. The Majority
The Lyng case presented the Supreme Court with a fact pattern
similar to those faced by the lower courts in Wilson and Badoni.
The dispute in Lyng arose from the government's decision to build
a road through federally-owned land traditionally used by Indian
tribes for religious practices. 8 Before deciding where to construct
the road, the United States Forest Service prepared an environ-
mental impact statement. 9 In preparing that statement, the Forest
Service commissioned a study of the American Indian cultural and
52. The Indians had claimed that the government violated their free exercise rights
by constructing a dam and a resultant lake which effectively "drowned some of plaintiffs'
gods and denied ... plaintiffs access to a prayer spot sacred to them." Id. at 176.
53. Id. at 177 n.4.
54. Id. at 178.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. See also Crow v. Gullet, 541 F. Supp. 785, 791-92 (D.S.D. 1982), affTd, 706 F.2d
856 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983) (court rejected Indian plaintiffs' claim
that the free exercise clause obligates the government to control the actions of the general
public which may interfere with plaintiffs' religious practice). For a more extensive dis-
cussion of cases brought by American Indians under the free exercise clause, see Com-
ment, Native Americans'Access to Religious Sites: Underprotected Under the Free Exercise
Clause?, 26 B.C.L. REV. 463, 466 (1985), and Comment, Northwest Indian Cemetery
Protective Association v. Peterson: Indian Religious Sites Prevail Over Public Land Devel-
opment, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 125 (1986).
58. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. 1319, 1322
(1988). The road would connect two other road segments. Id. at 1321. The district
court found, however, that the unconnected road segments had independent utility. Id.
at 1332-33 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Moreover, the need for the connecting road was
questionable. Id. at 1339 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 1321-22.
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religious sites in the area. The study found that the Yurok, Karok,
and Tolowa Indians historically had used the proposed construc-
tion area for religious purposes. 6° The study further concluded
that construction of a road through the proposed area "would
cause serious and irreparable damage to the sacred areas which are
an integral and necessary part of the belief systems and lifeway of
Northwest California Indian peoples."' 6 1 Although the study rec-
ommended against building the road, the Forest Service opted to
construct the road.62 The Forest Service rejected alternative sites
because the sites would have required the acquisition of private
land, raised soil stability problems, and intruded upon other areas
having ritualistic value to American Indians.63
After the government decided to build the road, various Indian
groups initiated court proceedings."4 They asserted that construc-
tion of the road constituted a violation of their first amendment
right to free exercise of religion.65 The lower courts agreed that the
government's construction of the road violated the first amend-
ment.66  Subsequently, the Supreme Court reversed those
decisions.67
The Supreme Court characterized the first amendment claim as
indistinguishable from the claim advanced in Bowen v. Roy. 68 In
Roy, the petitioner challenged a federal statute which required the
states to use social security numbers in administering welfare pro-
grams. 69 The Indian respondents in Lyng argued that the infringe-
60. Id. at 1322.
61. Id. (quoting THEODORATUS, RESOURCES OF THE CHIMNEY ROCK SECTION,
GASQUET-ORLEANS ROAD, Six RIVERS NATIONAL FOREST (1979)).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. The Indians made other challenges to the government's actions based upon
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969, several other federal statutes, and governmental trust responsibilities to Indians
living on the Hoopa Valley Reservation. Id. The lower courts found violations on a
number of statutory grounds as well as on the free exercise claim. Id. at 1323. Before
addressing the free exercise claim, the Supreme Court examined whether the first amend-
ment claim was necessary to the lower court's opinion. Id. at 1323-24. The Court deter-
mined that the statutory holdings would not have supported all the relief granted, and
therefore that it was "reasonably likely" that the first amendment issue was necessary to
the decision below. Id. at 1324. As a result, the Court proceeded to address the first
amendment issue. Id.
66. Id. at 1322-23. See Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 565
F. Supp. 586 (N.D. Cal. 1983), affid in part, 795 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1986).
67. 108 S. Ct. at 1330.
68. Id. at 1325. For a discussion of Roy, see supra notes 36-41 and accompanying
text.
69. 476 U.S. 693, 699 (1986).
[Vol. 20
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ment on their religious liberty was significantly greater than that in
Roy.70 The Court declared that it could not weigh the adverse ef-
fects on the petitioner in Roy against the impact on the Indians in
Lyng because of its inability to inquire into the truth of religious
beliefs."' Therefore, the Court merely acknowledged that in both
cases, the challenged governmental action interfered with the indi-
vidual's ability to pursue spiritual fulfillment. 72 It concluded, how-
ever, that the government action neither coerced the individuals
into violating their religious beliefs nor penalized religious activity
by denying a right, benefit, or privilege.73 The Court found that
coercion was necessary to sustain a free exercise claim.74
The Lyng Court also characterized its decision as consistent with
precedent. The Court acknowledged that in cases such as Sherbert
v. Verner 7 and Thomas v. Review Board,7 6 "indirect coercions or
penalties, not just outright prohibitions," constituted violations of
the first amendment.77 Nevertheless, the Court declared that:
This does not and cannot imply that incidental effects of govern-
ment programs, which may make it more difficult to practice cer-
tain religions but which have no tendency to coerce individuals
into acting contrary to their religious beliefs, require government
to bring forward a compelling justification for its otherwise law-
ful actions. 78
This distinction between coercive and non-coercive incidental ef-
fects formed the crux of the Lyng Court's opinion. The Court em-
phasized that the "crucial word" in the free exercise clause is
"prohibit. ' 79 Therefore, government actions do not violate the free
exercise clause unless they directly or indirectly operate to coerce
the individuals to violate their religious beliefs.8 ' In other words,
the initial analysis focuses on the form of the government's action
70. Lyng, 108 S. Ct. at 1325.
71. Id. (citing Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 1046, 1051 n.9
(1987)).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1326.
75. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). The coercion or penalty in Sherbert was that if Sherbert
refused to work on the Sabbath as required by his religion, he would be denied unemploy-
ment benefits. See supra notes 19-27 and accompanying text.
76. 450 U.S. 707 (1981). In Thomas, the coercion or penalty was that if Thomas quit
because his religion forbade him to fabricate weapons, he would be denied unemployment
benefits. See supra note 27.
77. Lyng, 108 S. Ct. at 1326.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
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rather than on the effect of that action on the religion.81
The Court did not consider the construction of the road through
the sacred area to be coercive, even though the construction could
virtually destroy the Indians' ability to practice their religion.8 2 As
a result, the government's action did not fall within the scope of
the free exercise clause- a The Court never proceeded to examine
whether the government had a compelling interest in constructing
the road or whether the least restrictive means were used. If the
Court had found a burden on religion cognizable under the first
amendment, the government would probably have been unable to
meet the compelling interest prong. The lower courts had found
that the need for the road was minimal.8 4 Indeed, both of the
lower courts had found a violation of the free exercise clause. 5
B. The Dissent
The dissent argued that the majority's opinion was inconsistent
with precedent.8 6 Specifically, the dissent asserted that the Sher-
bert and Thomas decisions "lent themselves to the coercion analy-
sis '"87 used by the majority in Lyng because the religions proscribed
conduct which the unemployment benefits laws effectively com-
pelled.8  Those decisions, however, "nowhere suggested that such
coercive compulsion exhausted the range of religious burdens rec-
81. The Court stated that "[w]hatever may be the exact line between unconstitutional
prohibitions on the free exercise of religion and the legitimate conduct by government of
its own affairs, the location of the line cannot depend on measuring the effects of a gov-
ernmental action on a religious objector's spiritual development." Id. See also id. at 1334
(Brennan, J., dissenting) ("I thus cannot accept the Court's premise that the form of the
Government's restraint on religious practice, rather than its effect, controls our constitu-
tional analysis.").
82. Id. at 1326.
83. Id. at 1326-27.
84. Id. at 1332 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan recognized that:
In particular, the [lower] court found that the road would not improve access to
timber resources in the Blue Creek Unit and indeed was unnecessary to the
harvesting of that timber; that it would not significantly improve the adminis-
tration of the Six Rivers National Forest; and that it would increase recreational
access only marginally, and at the expense of the very pristine environment that
makes the area suitable for primitive recreational use in the first place.
Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
85. See Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 586
(N.D. Cal. 1983), affid in part, 795 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1986).
86. Lyng, 108 S. Ct. at 1330 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The constitutional guarantee
we interpret today, however, draws no such fine distinctions between types of restraints
on religious exercises, but rather is directed against any form of governmental action that
frustrates or inhibits religious practice.").
87. Id. at 1334 (Brennan, J. dissenting).
88. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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ognized under the Free Exercise Clause." 9 Moreover, the dissent
characterized the Court's decision in Wisconsin v. Yoder 9° as based
upon the impact of the law on the religious practice itself, not upon
the source of that impact. 9' As a result, the dissent rejected "the
Court's premise that the form of the Government's restraint on
religious practice, rather than its effect, controls our constitutional
analysis. 92 Finally, the dissent maintained that Bowen v.Roy 93
was distinguishable from the situation in Lyng because Roy in-
volved government actions of a purely internal nature, whereas
"[flederal land-use decisions are likely to have substantial external
effects." 94 Because of that difference, the dissent asserted that land
use decisions are subject to greater public scrutiny than internal
decisions.95
The dissent then set forth an alternative interpretation of the free
exercise clause which the majority had explicitly rejected. The dis-
sent based its test upon the analysis employed by a number of
lower courts in reviewing similar cases. 96 First, religious "adher-
ents challenging a proposed use of federal land [w]ould be required
to show that the [government action] poses a substantial and realis-
tic threat of frustrating their religious practices." '97 Such a showing
would suffice to demonstrate a burden under the traditional three-
part test. 98 After this showing is made, the government would be
obliged to identify a compelling state interest sufficient to justify
the infringement on the religious practice. 99
IV. ANALYSIS
As the dissent noted, the majority's opinion in Lyng was not
mandated by precedent. In fact, the opinion represents a signifi-
cant departure from the focus of the cases upon which it relies. In
89. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
90. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
91. Lyng, 108 S. Ct. at 1334 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
92. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
93. 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
94. Lyng, 108 S. Ct. at 1336 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 1336-37. In support of that distinction, the dissent noted that the Ameri-
can Indian Religious Freedom Act (AIRFA), 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1982), expressly indi-
cates that land use decisions are not merely internal, and that they may have a substantial
effect on the religious practices of Indian groups. Id. at 1337 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
96. Lyng, 108 S. Ct. at 1338 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 1339 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
98. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
99. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). The majority in Lyng rejected that proposal as plac-
ing courts "in the untenable position of deciding what practices and beliefs are 'central' to
a given faith." Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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addition, the reasoning of the majority in Lyng is logically incon-
sistent. Finally, the Lyng decision cannot be justified as a result-
oriented opinion because the result is not practically desirable.
A. Conformity with Precedent
The Court in Lyng based its decision primarily on Bowen v.
Roy,"° but also characterized its opinion as consistent with Sher-
bert v. Verner,10 Thomas v. Review Board,11 2 and Wisconsin v.
Yoder. "3 Those decisions, however, do not mandate the result
reached in Lyng, and should have led to a contrary result.
The primary contention of the Court was that Lyng is indistin-
guishable from Roy." Despite the Court's assertion, the Lyng
case is not in accord with Roy. The Lyng Court's discussion of Roy
is incomplete, and ignores certain aspects of the decision that dis-
tinguish it from the facts of Lyng. For example, in Lyng, the Court
quoted from Roy as follows:
The Free Exercise Clause simply cannot be understood to require
the Government to conduct its own internal affairs in ways that
comport with the religious beliefs of particular citizens. Just as
the Government may not insist that [the Roys] engage in any set
form of religious observance, so [the Roys] may not demand that
the Government join in their chosen religious practices by re-
fraining from using a number to identify their daughter .... The
Free Exercise Clause affords an individual protection from cer-
tain forms of governmental compulsion; it does not afford an in-
dividual a right to dictate the conduct of the Government's
internal procedures.' 5
The sentence immediately preceding the quoted paragraph from
Roy, however, clarifies the distinction that the Roy Court was mak-
ing. The Roy Court noted that the petitioner objected to the statu-
tory requirement not because it placed any restriction on what he
could believe or do, but because he believed that the use of the
number could harm his daughter's spirit.10 6 Thus, the distinction
was made between government action that affirmatively impairs
the ability of an individual to practice his religion, and government
action that simply does not aid the individual in furthering his spir-
itual development. In that context, the Roy Court proceeded to
100. 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
101. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
102. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
103. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
104. Lyng, 108 S. Ct. at 1325.
105. Id. (quoting Roy, 476 U.S. at 699-700).
106. Roy, 476 U.S. at 699.
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state, in the portion quoted above, that the free exercise clause does
not require the government to conduct its own internal affairs in
ways that comport with the religious beliefs of particular
citizens. 107
Under this interpretation, the facts of Lyng are distinguishable
from Roy, in that the government action in Roy did not infringe on
the individual's ability to practice his religion. Instead, the internal
government action merely failed to maximize his spiritual develop-
ment. Thus, the government's own use of the social security
number in no way prohibited the free exercise of religion by Roy.
In Lyng, on the other hand, the government action does impair the
ability of the Indians to practice their religion, and in fact virtually
destroys their ability to do so.'° 8 An individual cannot expect con-
stitutional protection from government action which in no way im-
pairs her own ability to practice her religion, in spite of her belief
that the action will hinder her spiritual growth. On the other
hand, an individual should be able to expect protection from gov-
ernment action which destroys her ability to carry on the religious
ceremonies that are a central part of her religion. Thus, Roy and
Lyng addressed fundamentally different issues, and are not indis-
tinguishable as the Lyng Court maintained.109
The Court in Roy also implied that a situation such as Lyng
could violate the Constitution. The Court discussed the American
Indian Religious Freedom Act,110 which states that:
[I]t shall be the policy of the United States to protect and pre-
107. Id. at 699-700.
108. Lyng, 108 S. Ct. at 1326-27.
109. The contention that the Roy and Lyng decisions are indistinguishable as involv-
ing "internal" government decisions is unconvincing. First, the basis for the decision in
Roy was that the government action did not affect Roy's ability to practice his religion.
Id. at 699. The government action did not preclude Roy from engaging in any religious
practice at all; instead, the action simply did not accord with Roy's religious beliefs. Id.
To that extent, the government actions were merely "internal." In Lyng, on the other
hand, the government action could destroy the Indians' ability to practice their religion.
Therefore, the action at issue in Lyng is not "internal" as that term was understood by
the Roy Court. Second, based on any definition of internal, the government action in
Lyng should be considered external. Land use decisions inevitably have a direct external
effect. In fact, the American Indian Religious Freedom Act represents an "express con-
gressional determination" that federal land use decisions are likely to burden religious
practices. Lyng, 108 S. Ct. at 1337 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Finally' the determination
of whether actions are inherently internal or external simply adds another level of ambi-
guity to an already nebulous area of law. Such a focus produces an artificial distinction
between free exercise claims, which in no way is mandated by the language or precedent
of the first amendment. The relevant focus should be on whether or not the government
action effectively prohibits the free exercise of religion.
110. 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1982).
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serve for American Indians their inherent right of freedom to be-
lieve, express, and exercise the traditional religions of the
American Indian... including, but not limited to access to sites
... and freedom to worship through ceremonials and traditional
rites. '
The Court in Roy declared that the Act "with its emphasis on pro-
tecting the freedom to believe, express, and exercise a religion -
accurately identifies the mission of the Free Exercise Clause it-
self. 11 2 Because the use of the social security number did not im-
pair Roy's freedom to believe, express, or exercise his religion, the
Court found no burden on religion.' 3 In Lyng, however, the con-
struction of the road on the sacred land did impair the Indians'
ability to practice their religion, a point which the Court did not
dispute." 4 Thus, the very case upon which the Lyng Court relied
as dispositive indicated that a different result should be reached.
In addition, the Roy Court's discussion of the Act further indi-
cated that the free exercise clause is concerned with the impair-
ment on the religion, not the form of the action. In fact, the Roy
Court concluded that the protection of religion called for in the
Act accurately identified the mission of that clause."I5 The Lyng
Court, which made abundant use of the Roy opinion throughout
the rest of the its analysis, failed to mention this aspect of Roy in its
discussion of the Act. Instead, the Court merely declared that the
Act created no cause of action or any judicially enforceable indi-
vidual rights." 6 Thus, the Lyng decision certainly was not man-
dated by Roy, and, in fact, conflicts with the Roy Court's
understanding of the free exercise clause.
The majority in Lyng also attempted to characterize its decision
as consistent with past cases such as Sherbert, Thomas, and Yoder.
An examination of those cases, however, belies that assertion by
the Court. According to the Lyng Court, past free exercise cases
demonstrate that two types of government action could unconsti-
tutionally burden religion: a) actions -which coerce the adherents
into violating their religious beliefs; or b) actions which penalize
religious activity by denying adherents an equal share of rights and
benefits enjoyed by other citizens." 7
111. Id.
112. Roy, 476 U.S. at 700.
113. Id. at 700-01.
114. Lyng, 108 S. Ct. at 1326.
115. Roy, 476 U.S. at 700.
116. Lyng, 108 S. Ct. at 1328. Even the dissent in Lyng agreed that the Act did not
create any judicially enforceable rights. Id. at 1337 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
117. Id. at 1325.
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As an example of the former type of government action, the
Court in Lyng cited the Yoder decision. In Yoder, the Court previ-
ously found that a compulsory school attendance law violated the
free exercise clause because it placed an undue burden upon the
practice of the Amish religion.1 8 The Court in Lyng stated that
"there is nothing whatsoever in the Yoder opinion to support the
proposition that the 'impact' on the Amish religion would have
been constitutionally problematic if the statute at issue had not
been coercive in nature."" 9 Therefore, the Court narrowly read
Yoder to set up the dual requirement that only a statute that is
both coercive and that has an impact can be unconstitutional.
This dual requirement, although not inconsistent with the literal
language of Yoder, represents a very strained reading of that case.
The impact in Yoder arose directly because the statute was coer-
cive. If attendance had not been mandatory, the Amish could have
kept their children home, and no impact or burden on the religion
would have resulted. Therefore, the Yoder Court did not specifi-
cally address the question of whether a non-coercive government
action which has an impact on free exercise is unconstitutional.
Instead, the language of the Yoder opinion indicates that the Court
was more concerned with the impact on religion than with the
form of the government's action.
In Yoder, the Court discussed at great length the negative im-
pact of the law on religion. 120 That decision included consideration
of the Amish lifestyle, the sincerity of the belief, and the role that
belief and daily conduct play in the continuation of the Amish reli-
gion. 2 1 At no time did the Court discuss the coercive nature of the
statute independently from the consideration of its impact. More-
over, in finding a burden on religion, the Court noted that the law
"carries with it precisely the kind of objective danger to the free
exercise of religion that the First Amendment was designed to pre-
vent." 122 That objective danger was the threat of undermining the
Amish community and their religious practice, and forcing them
either to abandon their belief or to migrate to a more tolerant
region. 123
The Yoder Court thus did not emphasize the government's ac-
tion, but rather stressed the effect of the law on the religion. More-
118. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
119. Lyng, 108 S. Ct. at 1329.
120. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 208-11, 215-19, 235.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 218.
123. Id. at 235.
Loyola University Law Journal
over, in examining the kind of objective danger that the free
exercise clause is designed to prevent, the Court did not discuss the
danger of prohibitive government actions, or the need to guard
against certain forms of government action. Instead, the focus was
on the impact of the law on the religion and the danger posed to its
survival.
The "objective danger" noted by the Court in Yoder is equally
applicable to the situation in Lyng. In Lyng, the Court assumed
that the road would virtually destroy the ability of the Indians to
practice their religion. 124 Thus, the road certainly carries with it
the threat of undermining the Indian community and religious
practice. Moreover, the road impacts on the Indians even more
severely because they do not have the option of migrating to some
other region. The land-specific nature of their religion means that
no other land can substitute for the land upon which the road is
being built.' 25 Thus, to the extent that the Yoder opinion empha-
sized the impact on the religion, the Lyng Court failed to follow
that case. The Court in Lyng instead interpreted the Yoder deci-
sion as being based on the coercive nature of the statute.
26
Although the Yoder Court could have based its decision on the
coercive nature of the statute, nothing in the language of that case
indicates that it actually did SO. 127
Like Yoder, the Sherbert Court also indicated that the relevant
focus is on the impact of the government action. 28 In fact, the
Sherbert decision specifically states that "[i]f the purpose or effect
of a law is to impede the observance of one or all religions ... that
124. Lyng, 108 S. Ct. at 1326.
125. For a discussion of the "site-specific" nature of Indian religions, in contrast to
traditional western religions, see id. at 1330-32 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
126. Id. at 1329.
127. In fact, numerous lower court cases have interpreted Yoder and Sherbert as
mandating consideration of impact. For instance, the court in EEOC v. Pacific Press
Publishing Association, 676 F.2d 1272, 1279 (9th Cir. 1982), interpreted those cases as
meaning that a free exercise challenge to a neutrally-based statute involves weighing, first
of all, the magnitude of the statute's impact upon the exercise of the religious belief. In
general, the lower courts have assumed that a burden on religion is established by demon-
strating an impact. See EEOC v. Mississippi College, 626 F.2d 477, 488 (5th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 453 U.S. 912 (1981); Walsh v. Louisiana High School Athletic Ass'n, 616
F.2d 152, 157-58 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1124 (1981) ("To pass constitu-
tional muster, the application of such a regulation.. . must not interfere with, burden, or
deny the free exercise of a legitimate religious belief."); United States v. Means, 627 F.
Supp. 247, 258 (D.S.D. 1985) (court declared that it must look at the facts and "decide
whether there exists a real negative impact upon the exercise of the religion that is signifi-
cant enough to be labeled a burden").
128. For lower court cases which interpreted Sherbert as mandating consideration of
impact, see supra note 127 and accompanying text.
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law is constitutionally invalid."' 29 Despite this statement, the Lyng
Court effectively eliminated the relevance of the "effect" in evaluat-
ing actions that are deemed to be non-coercive. 130 Thus, the Lyng
decision certainly was not mandated by precedent, and, in fact,
represented a departure from at least the spirit, and often the lan-
guage, of past free exercise cases. 3 1
B. Logical Consistency
In addition to its disregard for precedent, the Lyng Court's em-
phasis on the form of government action rather than its effect is
logically indefensible. First, a pure emphasis on form over effect
would logically require the overruling of cases involving penalties,
such as Sherbert v. Verner and Thomas v. Review Board. Second,
the Court failed to explain the crucial step upon which the word
"prohibit" in the free exercise clause became synonymous with
"coerce." Finally, the cases relied on to support the Lyng decision
never claimed to define the outer reaches of the free exercise clause,
although they are treated by the Court as doing so.
129. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963) (quoting Braunfeld v. Brown, 366
U.S. 599, 607 (1961)) (emphasis added). See also Comment, Native Americans'Access to
Religious Sites: Underprotected Under the Free Exercise Clause?, 26 B.C.L. REV. 463,
466 (1985) ("Government action may burden religion when it inhibits or prohibits activ-
ity important to the practice of a particular religion.").
130. Other commentators also had interpreted the prior Supreme Court cases as
mandating consideration of effect or impact. See, e.g., J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J.
YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1068 (3d ed. 1986) ("In earlier cases the Court men-
tioned the need to show that the state regulation amounted to 'coercion.' Today any
regulation which substantially impairs the practice of a religion will be sufficiently 'coer-
cive' to merit further review under the balancing test.").
131. In addition, the decision, to some extent, conflicts with the purpose of the free
exercise clause as explicated by the Supreme Court. Discussions by the Court regarding
the values underlying the first amendment indicate a predominant concern with preserv-
ing individual liberty. The focus is on protecting that liberty from infringement by the
government, and no justification emerges for distinguishing between types of government
action. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 53-54 n.38 (1985), wherein the court
quoted James Madison's "Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments"
(1785) as follows:
The Religion then of every man must be left to the conviction and conscience of
every man; and it is the right of every man to exercise it as these may dictate.
This right is in its nature an unalienable right .... We maintain therefore that
in matters of Religion, no man's right is abridged by the institution of Civil
Society.
Id. See also Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 226 (1963) (the Court
declared that "the place of religion in our society is an exalted one" and that the govern-
ment could not invade that area "whether its purpose or effect be to aid or oppose");
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947);
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 3 10 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (characterized the first amendment as
"safeguarding" the free exercise of religion).
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The Court recognized two general categories of government ac-
tion as potentially burdening religion.132 The first category in-
cludes coercive action, of which Yoder is an example. 3 3 The
second category involves action which penalizes religious activity
by denying participants an equal share of benefits enjoyed by other
citizens.' Examples of this latter type of action can be found in
the unemployment benefit cases such as Thomas v. Review
Board,'35 Sherbert v. Verner, 136 and Hobbie v. Unemployment Ap-
peals Commission. 37
Contrary to the Lyng Court's assertion, those cases did not in-
volve government action that constituted, in form, a penalty. For
example, a law could mandate that anyone engaging in certain reli-
gious activities pay a certain amount of money. Such a law clearly
would be a penalty. The unemployment compensation statutes,
however, were facially-neutral statutes which did not set up any
penalty for certain actions - religious or otherwise. Such a stat-
ute, however, may have the impact of a penalty on certain reli-
gions. 13  Thus, before characterizing a statute as a penalty, the
Court must examine the impact of the law on the religion or its
followers. If the effect of the law is to penalize the practice of reli-
gion, then the facially-neutral law would fall under one of the cate-
gories of government actions which may burden religion.
The Court in Lyng declined to examine the effect of the govern-
ment's action, stating that "[w]hatever may be the exact line be-
tween unconstitutional prohibitions on the free exercise of religion
and the legitimate conduct by government of its own affairs, the
location of the line cannot depend on measuring the effects of a
governmental action on a religious objector's spiritual develop-
ment."' 139 Despite the Court's objections to line-drawing based on
effect, in cases such as Sherbert, Thomas, and Hobbie, the effect
will determine that line. A statute may burden the free exercise of
132. Lyng, 108 S. Ct. at 1326.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
136. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
137. 107 S. Ct. 1046 (1987).
138. For instance, the applicant in Sherbert had been fired by her employer because
she would not work on Saturday, the Sabbath. She could not find another job because of
her refusal to work on Saturday. She was declared ineligible for benefits under the statute
because she failed, without good cause, to accept available suitable work when offered to
her. That provision of the statute clearly serves the necessary purpose of eliminating
payment to claimants who are unwilling to work. As applied in Sherbert, however, the
statute had the effect of penalizing the applicant for the exercise of her religion.
139. Lyng, 108 S. Ct. at 1326.
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religion unconstitutionally if it has the effect of a penalty. On the
other hand, if the effect of government action is to prevent the reli-
gious practice altogether as in Lyng, the action will not raise free
exercise concerns. Thus, the Lyng Court, while purporting to rely
solely on the form of government action in determining a burden
on religion, actually preserved an analysis of effect or impact for an
entire category of cases.
The logic of the Court is also questionable insofar as it excludes
a crucial step in its reasoning. The Court throughout the opinion
asserted that the government action did not fall under the protec-
tion of the free exercise clause because the action was not coer-
cive. 1,0 The Court then noted that the crucial word in the clause is
"prohibit."' 1 The Court failed to explain, however, why the term
"prohibit" is necessarily synonymous with "coerce" instead of an
alternative word such as "impair," which also appears abundantly
in free exercise cases. Moreover, the Court quoted past cases
under the free exercise clause which involved coercive government
action. 4 2 Admittedly, those cases clearly support the proposition
that coercive government action is subject to first amendment scru-
tiny. The Court relied on those cases to conclude that only coer-
cive actions fall under the free exercise clause, and therefore that
the Indians could not prevail in their claim. Despite that conten-
tion, the Court could cite no language from those cases which de-
fined the outer reaches of the free exercise clause. Thus, the Court
erred in treating those cases as excluding non-coercive action,
when in fact they simply did not address that issue at all."' 3
Finally, the determination that certain actions constitute "coer-
cion" while others do not is essentially one of semantics. The Lyng
case may be characterized as a situation in which government ac-
tion forced three Indian tribes to abandon the practice of their reli-
gion. On the other hand, the situation may be described as one in
which government action destroyed the ability of those tribes to
practice their religion. The former description uses terms which
would indicate coercion, whereas the latter summation used by the
140. See, e.g., id. at 1325-26, 1329.
141. Id. at 1326.
142. See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
143. While the issue was not directly addressed, the focus of the analysis regarding
the coercive actions can provide some guidance. The language of those opinions indicates
that the impact on religion was the predominant concern, and therefore that non-coercive
government action should be subject to first amendment scrutiny if the action's effect is to
impair the practice of religion.
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Court does not necessarily raise the specter of compulsion. Of
course, even the latter description implies coercive effect, but the
Court disregarded the effect. Thus, reliance on the coercive nature
of the government's action may not be a useful standard because it
is inherently subjective and susceptible to attack.
C. Practical Desirability
In addition to the logical inconsistencies, the Lyng decision is
not necessarily desirable from a practical standpoint, and thus can-
not be justified as a "result-oriented" decision. In fact, the three
fears articulated by the Court were unfounded. First, in analyzing
the Indians' claim, the Lyng Court was concerned that a decision
for the Indians would severely curtail the ability of the government
to utilize its land."4 Furthermore, the Court was concerned that
application of the dissent's test would involve the Court in the un-
constitutional task of determining the scope and merit of religious
belief."' Finally, the Lyng Court expressed apprehension that a
contrary decision could lead to claims for Indian possession of fed-
eral land to the exclusion of other groups. 146
The Lyng Court's fear that a decision in favor of the Indians
would unduly restrict the government's use of federal land was un-
warranted. The lower courts have handled numerous cases which
are factually identical to the present one. 147 In those cases, the
courts examined the impact on religion to determine whether a
burden existed.1 48 Even with that focus on impact, however, the
vast majority of religious groups failed to demonstrate a constitu-
tional violation under the traditional three-part test.149 Thus, the
Court could have included noncoercive action within the protec-
tion of the free exercise clause without wreaking havoc on the abil-
ity of government to use its land.
The analysis employed by those lower courts is substantially
similar to that advocated by the dissent in Lyng. Like past free
exercise cases, the dissent would retain a balancing test, and would
not consider the form of the government's action as definitive of
whether a burden on religion existed. 50 In order to demonstrate a
144. Lyng, 108 S. Ct. at 1327.
145. Id. at 1329-30.
146. Id. at 1327.
147. See supra notes 42-57 and accompanying text.
148. Id.
149. Id.; see also Comment, Native Americans' Access To Religious Sites: Underpro-
tected Under the Free Exercise Clause?, 26 B.C.L. REV. 463 (1985).
150. Lyng, 108 S. Ct. at 1334 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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burden in a dispute involving land use, the dissent would require
the religious group to demonstrate that the land was "central" or
"indispensable" for a religious practice or belief. 51 The Court mis-
characterized the dissent's approach as requiring a judicial deter-
mination of which religious practices or beliefs are "central" to a
religion.'52 Based on that interpretation, the Court then declared
that the Constitution will not allow inquiry into whether a sin-
cerely-held belief is central; therefore, the test could not be used
unless a mere "assertion of centrality" is all that would be re-
quired."5 3 The Court instead preferred not to protect the religion
at all.
Despite the Court's mischaracterization, the test proposed by
the dissent would not present the Court with a constitutional di-
lemma. The Indians would be required to show only that the spe-
cific land in question was central or indispensable for a certain
religious belief or practice. Such a showing would not require the
Court to inquire into the religion in any greater depth than would
be normally required. In effect, the test merely restates the initial
requirement that an individual demonstrate an impairment or bur-
den on that individual's religious practice.' 54 If the land is not cen-
tral to a religious practice, no actual impairment on free exercise
would exist, and the first amendment claim could not succeed.
Once a claimant demonstrates a burden by proving the indispensa-
ble nature of the land, however, the government would have to
demonstrate a compelling interest and show that the least restric-
tive means was employed to address that interest.
That test mirrors the Court's analysis in past cases.' For in-
stance, in Yoder, the Court examined the sincerity of the religious
beliefs, and the interrelationship between belief and lifestyle.'56
The Yoder Court found a burden on the Amish religion only after
it first determined that isolation from the ways of the secular world
was central to the practice of that religion. Moreover, in Thomas,
the Court inquired into whether a belief was based on Thomas'
religion or was merely a philosophical choice. 57 Thus, the prece-
dent cited by the Lyng majority provided ample support for an
examination into whether the land had religious significance and
151. Id. at 1338-39 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
152. Id. at 1329-30.
153. Id. at 1329.
154. See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 12-41 and accompanying text.
156. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 235 (1972).
157. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 713 (1981).
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was necessary for a religious practice. 158
Finally, lower courts addressing claims similar to Lyng have
used the test advocated by the dissent. For example, in Wilson v.
Block,'59 Hopi and Navajo Indians unsuccessfully challenged a
government decision allowing private expansion of a ski area in the
San Francisco Peaks in Cocino National Forest. 16 In analyzing
whether a burden on religion existed, the court required the plain-
tiffs to demonstrate that the government land was indispensable to
some religious practice, whether or not it was central to their reli-
gion.' 6' Thus, the plaintiffs in Wilson had to demonstrate that the
government land use would impair a religious practice that could
not be performed at an alternative site.' 62  Because the Indian
groups were unable to show such an impairment, no burden was
found. 163 The Wilson court, therefore, recognized the distinction
between centrality to a practice and centrality to a religion. The
dissent in Lyng advocated the former, but the Court addressed
only the latter.
If the Lyng Court had utilized the dissent's approach, the Indi-
ans clearly would have been able to demonstrate a burden on reli-
gion. In fact, the Court repeatedly acknowledged that the road
would impair the Indians' ability to practice their religion." 4 To
the extent that the Court's form-over-effect standard resulted from
an alleged inability to balance the interests adequately any other
way,165 the dissent's test destroys the justification for that standard.
The proposed test is consistent with precedent, and would not un-
constitutionally make the Court an arbiter of religious truth or
centrality. The Court's failure to address adequately the viability
of that test undermines its continual protestations 66 that no other
158. In fact, the Yoder decision could even support analysis into the centrality of the
practice itself to the religion. For instance, in Yoder the Court declared that "[t]his con-
cept of life aloof from the world and its values is central to their [the Amish] faith."
Yoder, 406 U.S. at 210. In that case, however, the Court was not concerned with the
effect of the education requirement on any specific religious practice, but rather with its
effect on the entire Amish lifestyle and faith.
159. 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 956 (1983).
160. Id. at 737-38.
161. Id. at 743.
162. Id. at 744.
163. Id. at 744-45.
164. See, e.g., Lyng, 108 S. Ct. at 1322, 1324-26.
165. Id. at 1327-28.
166. For example, in Lyng, the Court stated that "[h]owever much we might wish it
were otherwise, government simply could not operate if it were required to satisfy every
citizen's religious needs and desires." Id. at 1327. It also stated that "[notwithstanding
the sympathy that we all must feel for the plight of the Indian respondents, it is plain that
the approach taken by the dissent cannot withstand analysis." Id. at 1329.
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result was possible.
In an alternative objection, the Court maintained that if the In-
dians' position was upheld, the Indians could then seek to exclude
all human activity except their own on similar grounds.'67 This
fear is unfounded, and cannot withstand scrutiny for several rea-
sons. First, the Court is not free to reject the requirements of the
Constitution when conformity with those requirements proves bur-
densome. If construction of the road truly imposes a burden upon
the free exercise of religion, and no compelling government interest
is shown, then the Court must find a violation of the Constitution.
Moreover, a contrary decision in this case would not have meant
success in any subsequent action which challenged access to the
site by others. In Lyng, the government was acting affirmatively in
a manner which destroyed the ability of the Indians to practice
their religion. In the type of challenge envisioned by the Court,
however, the Indians would be asking the government to act in a
way which would restrict the access of the general public to the
site. Such a request would raise establishment clause implications.
Even if the government could constitutionally restrict public ac-
cess, the free exercise clause would not require such action. That
clause declares that the government cannot act in a way to prohibit
the free exercise of religion. It does not, however, mandate that
the government protect that religion from unrelated forces in soci-
ety. In other words, the Court could uphold the claim in Lyng
without setting up the government as a shield to protect religions
from all threats or nuisances.
Some lower courts have in fact addressed the type of claim pos-
ited by the Court, and have rejected it on constitutional grounds.
For instance, in Badoni v. Higginson, 6 1 the plaintiffs objected to
the presence of tourists at the Rainbow Bridge National Monu-
ment because the tourists prevented the Indians from holding cere-
monies near the Bridge. The plaintiffs argued that the government
burdened the free exercise of religion by permitting access to the
area by the public and commercial tour boats.' 69 The court con-
cluded that the government did not violate the Constitution be-
cause the government action did not prohibit religious exercises in
the area. '7 0 The plaintiffs had equal access to the site, and the com-
plaint arose from the actions of tourists, not the government.
167. Id. at 1326-27.
168. 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 954 (1981).
169. Id. at 178.
170. Id.
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Moreover, the court noted that the plaintiffs sought affirmative ac-
tion by the government, which implicated the establishment clause
of the first amendment.17 Thus, the Lyng Court's concern with
the "snowball effect" of a decision for the Indians was unfounded
and should not have affected its decision.
V. IMPACT
As a result of the Lyng decision, the free exercise clause protects
individuals or religions only from government action that the court
deems to be "coercive." Any non-coercive action by the govern-
ment will be upheld without inquiry, even if it destroys the claim-
ants' ability to practice their religion. Indians will undoubtedly
feel the most significant impact because of the land-specific nature
of their religions. The impact will be intensified because the unfor-
tunate history of this country's relationship with Indian tribes has
resulted in government ownership of much land which the Indians
traditionally have considered to be sacred. The Court has now
given the government free rein to utilize that land in any manner it
sees fit, as long as the government action does not constitute com-
pulsion or a penalty.
Under the Lyng approach, the government can act in ways
which are detrimental to religions without being subject to any real
scrutiny by the courts. This reality could result in government
harassment of certain "unpopular" religions or cults because the
government will not be required to demonstrate the necessity for
its action. Moreover, the likely targets of such harassment typi-
cally lack the political power to effect change through the executive
or legislative branches.
The government's ability to act in a manner that is detrimental
to religions, however, may be limited in a number of ways. First of
all, those government actions are limited to purely non-coercive
measures. The susceptibility of other religions to harassment tac-
tics has yet to be seen, but the possibility that the government
could at least inconvenience other religions certainly exists. Sec-
ond, the government must act in conformity with the decree of
McCullogh v. Maryland.172 In McCullogh, the Court stated that
the government may not, "under the pretext of executing its pow-
ers, pass laws for the accomplishment of objects not entrusted to
the government."' 173 Thus, if the government action was designed
171. Id. at 178-79.
172. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
173. Id. at 423.
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to restrict the free exercise of religion, the non-coercive nature of
the action would not save it from constitutional scrutiny.
Finally, lower courts could narrow the applicability of the Lyng
case, thereby limiting its repercussions. For instance, lower courts
could avoid applying Lyng to fact situations not involving govern-
ment land use. The language of the Lyng opinion, however, does
not easily lend itself to such a constricted application.
On the other hand, courts may be able to accept the reasoning of
the Lyng Court and still rely on the free exercise clause to limit
government action in cases that are factually similar to Lyng. For
example, the Supreme Court has held that "[t]he First Amendment
is . . .broad enough to encompass those rights that, while not
unambiguously enumerated in the very terms of the Amendment,
are nonetheless necessary to the enjoyment of other First Amend-
ment rights."' 74 This penumbra theory was enunciated in the free
speech context, but was not explicitly limited to that area. More-
over, the Court has indicated that the various clauses of the first
amendment operate to protect the same fundamental values. 75
Thus, any clause of the first amendment theoretically should be
read as encompassing those rights necessary for its proper enjoy-
ment. In other words, no clear reason exists for excluding the free
exercise clause from the reach of a penumbra theory.
By applying a penumbra theory, courts could hold some non-
coercive government actions to be unconstitutional while still con-
forming to the Lyng decision. In Lyng, the Court held that non-
coercive government actions are not included in the wording of the
free exercise clause. 7 6 A penumbra theory, however, allows for
protection of rights that are not explicitly included in the first
amendment. Lower courts then could hold that protection from
non-coercive government action is necessary to the enjoyment of
the free exercise right. Thus, courts could conclude that the right
to exercise freely one's religion, to be meaningful, must include
protection from government actions which virtually destroy one's
ability to practice that religion. Under a penumbra theory, a court
could then find a violation of the free exercise clause in a fact situa-
tion similar to Lyng.
174. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 604 (1982) (citing Rich-
mond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 579-80 (1980)).
175. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
176. Lyng, 108 S. Ct. at 1326.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The Lyng decision substantially narrows the scope of the free
exercise clause. To demonstrate a burden under that clause, peti-
tioners are now required to show that the government's action is
coercive in form. Absent a showing of coercion, a free exercise
claim will fail regardless of the extent to which the government
action impairs the religious practice. Even if petitioners do estab-
lish a burden on religion, the government action may be constitu-
tional if justified by a compelling government interest. A guaranty
of freedom to exercise one's religion, however, is meaningless if the
conditions under which that freedom may be exercised can be shat-
tered. Allowing the free exercise of religion while destroying the
individual's ability to exercise that freedom is akin to granting the
freedom to vote but banning elections. The freedom technically
exists, but it is a right without any substance.
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